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1. INTRODUCTION.
The Isle of Man is an almost entirely self-governing Crown Dependency within the British 
Isles. The population of around 80,000 is evenly split between Manx born and non-Manx born 
residents.1 As a largely autonomous territory, the Isle of Man has made use of its power to 
create its own laws to build a distinctive economy with financial services, online gaming, and 
registration of shipping, aircraft and spacecraft making a substantial contribution.  
Discussion of the Manx constitution tends to focus on the external constitution, in particular 
the relationship of the Isle of Man with the United Kingdom either individually,2 or as a part of 
the broader category of Crown Dependencies.3 Reflections on the external constitution have 
been been given a new urgency by the Brexit crisis in the United Kingdom,4 and the possible 
intervention of Parliament in the regulation of financial services in the Crown Dependencies.5 
The internal constitution of the Isle of Man, on the other hand, has been comparatively under-
researched.6 
1 IOMG, 2016 Isle of Man Census Report, (2017) GD 2017/004 at 8. 
2 PW Edge, “David, Goliath and Supremacy: The Isle of Man and the Sovereignty of the United 
Kingdom Parliament” [1995] Anglo-American Law Review 1-30; CCA Pearce, “When is a colony 
not a colony? England and the Isle of Man”, [2003] Common Law World Review  32(4), 368-
398. 
3 P Morris, “Constitutional practices and British Crown Dependencies: The gap between 
theory and practice” (2012) Common Law World Review 41(1), 1-28. 
4 A Sutton, “The impact of Brexit on the Channel Islands and other territories”, (2018) 22(3) 
Jersey and Guernsey Law Review 260-322; S Alegre, “Brexit, human rights and self-
determination – a perfect storm in the British Crown Dependencies and Overseas 
Territories?” [2018] European Human Rights Law Review 311-314 
5 See Governments of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man,  Joint Statement on the Proposed 
Amendments to the Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill, 1 March 2019. 
6 But see PW Edge, Manx Public Law, (Isle of Man Law Society, 1997); J Belchem (ed.), A New 
History of the Isle of Man: The Modern Period 1830-1999, (Liverpool University Press, 2000); 
DG Kermode, Offshore Island Politics: The Constitutional and Political Development of the Isle 
of Man in the Twentieth Century (Liverpool UP, 2001); DG Kermode, Ministerial Government 
in the Isle of Man, (Manx Heritage Foundation, 2008).   
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The principal organ of Manx governance is Tynwald. Tynwald is a tricameral legislature – the 
House of Keys, the Legislative Council, and (when both sit together) Tynwald Court - from 
which are drawn the Manx executive. The directly elected, 24 member, House of Keys is the 
dominant Branch of Tynwald. The 11 member Legislative Council, consisting primarily of 
House of Keys appointees, but including the Anglican Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man, now 
has a secondary role in the legislative and executive business of Tynwald.  
Tynwald, in common with some other small jurisdictions’ legislatures,7 is not the site for 
extensive party politics, with the overwhelming majority of Tynwald sitting as independents – 
in the 2016 General Election to the House of Keys, for instance, independents won 21 of the 
24 seats, with Liberal Vannin securing the other 3. The norm of the independent member of 
Tynwald has implications for party discipline even for the small parties that do exist. Liberal 
Vannin, for instance, had two candidates elected in 2006, one of whom resigned to sit as an 
independent; while in  the 2016 election, three Liberal Vannin candidates were returned, but 
one resigned to sit as an independent. 
In 2016 Lord Lisvane, former Clerk of the House of Commons, was commissioned to report 
on the functioning of Tynwald. This Lisvane Review, although itself the product of 
constitutional controversy, has been fundamental in shaping the debate between 2016 and 
2018. In this article I show that the constitutional controversies of the Lisvane period are best 
understood as a modern iteration of the ancient constitutional norm of conflict between Keys 
and Council. Current recent reforms to Tynwald are placed within a broader body of 
constitutional scholarship around both particular challenges, and the structural challenges of 
7 But not all. See further J Corbett and W Veenendaal, Democracy in Small States: Persisting 
against all odds, (2018) at 92-118. 
democratic governance in such a small national jurisdiction.8 Placing the Isle of Man in this 
broader theoretical and comparative context not only illuminates the policy decisions facing 
the Isle of Man, but also contributes to understanding constitutional reform in very small 
democracies. In particular, the Lisvane period in Manx constitutional reform provides an 
important corrective to Morris’ study of failed constitutional reform in Alderney, which led her 
to question “Are small (island) polities capable of constitutional reform?”.9 
This paper is in five parts, moving from this introduction to an overview of Manx constitutional 
history focussing on those fundamental issues which have shaped the Manx constitutional 
landscape.  Part 3 is devoted to the Lisvane Review, and its immediate reception. Part 4 draws 
out the key constitutional debates around Lisvane, evaluating constitutional change and 
controversy around three key topics: (a) the appointment of members to the Council; (b) the 
authority of Council in relation to the Manx government; and (c) the challenges facing Tynwald 
in relation to gender diversity. Part 5 uses the recent Manx experience to draw broader 
conclusions about small jurisdiction constitutional reform, reflecting on the challenges facing 
small democracies as a consequence of their smallness – concentration of power, the challenges 
of managing intimacy, and the resources available for constitutional reform.  
2. THE EVOLUTION OF TYNWALD TO 2016.
Between 1417 and 1765 the King, later Lord, of Man was an English magnate.10 The Lord was 
rarely present on the Isle of Man, however, and appointed a Governor, or Lieutenant-Governor, 
8 For an introduction to the broader field of small state studies, see NDJ Baldwin (ed.), Legislatures of Small 
States: A comparative Study (Routledge, 2013); R Steinmetz and A Wivel (eds.), Small states in Europe: 
Challenges and opportunities (Ashgate, 2010).  
9 C Morris, “Attempting constitutional reform on the island microjurisdiction of Alderney”, 
(2018) Common Law World Review 47(2), 105 at 128. 
10 See further R Dickinson, The Lordship of Man under the Stanley’s, (Chetham Society, 1998);. 
to govern the Island. The primary institutions for the Lieutenant-Governor to do so were the 
Council for executive government, and Tynwald as a whole for legislation.11 
The Governor convened the Council. Membership was fairly fluid, but included a core of 
officers appointed by the Lord including the Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man and other 
ecclesiastical officers.12 The principal executive powers in the Island lay with the Council, and 
its officers acting in their particular roles. The Council, dominated by the Lieutenant-Governor, 
exercised almost all executive powers in the Isle of Man during this period.13   
By 1609 legislative power was vested in the Tynwald, consisting of this Council and the House 
of Keys acting together. From 1704 the two constituent parts began to meet as separate 
“branches”. Distinctively, successful passage of an Act of Tynwald required not only the assent 
of both Council and Keys, but also the assent of a majority of Tynwald meeting together – what 
Lord Lisvane identified as practical bicameralism within a tricameral legislature.14 Once passed 
by Tynwald, a Bill required the assent of the Lord to become an Act of Tynwald.  
In contrast to the Lord’s Council, the Keys, although subject to the Lord, were seen as 
representatives of the country. The Keys founded their autonomous status on a judgment of the 
Manx judges, the Deemsters, that the Keys nominated candidates for a vacancy to the 
Governor.15 As a result, “the Keys became more and more a closed corporation and 
membership was largely confined to a few leading families”.16 Just before the introduction of 
elections in the middle of the 19th century, they were described to the Lieutenant Governor as 
11 PW Edge, Manx Public Law, (IOLMS, 1997) Chapter 6; AW Moore, A History of the Isle of Man, (Fisher Unwin, 
1900) at Book Vi. 
12 W Sachaverell, An account of the Isle of Man, (1702), Essay Three. 
13 J Gell, Treatise on the Constitution of the Isle of Man, (Government House, 1881) 
14 Lisvane, Review of the Functioning of Tynwald, (2016) GD 2016/0047 at 15, 20; hereafter 
Lisvane. 
15 Lib Scacc, 1659. 
16 R.B. Moore, “The Roll of the Keys”, (1956) IOMNHAS (P) V(2), 47.  
“the Gentry of the Island both in talent and property”.17 As might be expected with an official 
Council and a “national” Keys, tension between the Keys and the Council was endemic, and 
could flare into open conflict. For instance, there was an ongoing dispute over the powers of 
the Council which involved imprisonment en masse of members of the Keys in 1715, and a 
purge of the Keys by the Governor in 1726.  
In 1765 the British Crown purchased the majority of the regnal rights from the Lord of Man. 
The functions of the Lord of Man were taken over by the British Crown directly, but the internal 
constitution of the Island was left strikingly untouched. Tensions between Council and Keys 
remained, with the British Crown stepping into the place of the former English Lord. 
In 1866, two important, intermeshed, constitutional reforms took place. Firstly, a degree of 
autonomy was restored to the Isle of Man through an Act of Parliament which provided for 
increased Isle of Man Government control of financial matters.18 Control of surplus revenues 
lay with Tynwald subject to veto by the Lieutenant-Governor, rather than with a government 
deriving authority from Tynwald. Secondly, the House of Keys was transformed from a self-
perpetuating oligarchy to a directly elected chamber. Although the principle of an elected Keys 
was implemented in 1867, the initial franchise was limited to adult males able to meet a high 
property qualification.19 The Isle of Man moved comparatively swiftly to female suffrage, 
however, with the House of Keys Election Act 1881.20  
A previous Lieutenant-Governor of the Island, Lord Hope, had opposed the democratisation of 
the Keys because he feared that greater legitimacy would lead to a more assertive House of 
Keys, so that they would “claim far greater and more arbitrary power … at issue with the British 
                                                          
17 Drinkwater to Loch, 2 Feb 1863, (SRO: Loch Papers, GD 268/116). 
18 Isle of Man Customs and Harbours Act 1866. 
19 D.G. Kermode, Offshore Island Politics: The constitutional and political development of the 
Isle of Man in the Twentieth Century, (2001) at 23.  
20 On which see R Fyson, The struggle for Manx democracy, (2016) 217-248. 
government and any Council consisting of Members nominated by the Crown”.21 With the 
move to an elected House of Keys, conflicts between the Keys and the Council did indeed 
intensify, with the Manx/Imperial tension enhanced by a tension between elected and unelected 
members of Tynwald.  
The Lieutenant-Governor remained in charge of the executive. In 1866 responsible government 
was not seen as suitable for a territory as small as the Isle of Man, and the Governor remained 
supreme head of government.22 As discussed below, it was not until the latter part of the 
twentieth century that an executive responsible to Tynwald became a key feature of the Manx 
constitution.23 
The twentieth century saw tremendous changes in the Manx constitution, shaped significantly 
by two expert reports originating as a result of Manx pressure, but drawing on external 
expertise.  
In 1911 a Departmental Committee was appointed by the UK Home Secretary, led by Lord 
MacDonnell.24 The Committee considered proposals from the Keys for the creation of an 
Executive Council, and reforming the composition of the Council so that the majority of its 
members would be directly elected, with a minority nominated by the Crown.25  The 
MacDonnell Report rejected the idea of an Executive Council, but endorsed reform of the 
composition of the Council. They supported the idea of an elected element in the Council, while 
rejecting direct election in favour of the Keys acting as an electoral college. The Report’s 
reasoning is interesting: “if the party system were developed in the House of Keys we think 
                                                          
21 Hope to Fitzroy, 16 August 1853 (MNHL: Letterbook vi, f, 578-95). 
22 R.H. Kinvig, The Isle of Man: A social, cultural and political history, (1975) 156-162. 
23 D.G. Kermode, Offshore Island Politics: The constitutional and political development of the 
Isle of Man in the Twentieth Century, (2001). 
24 Formally, Report of the Departmental Committee on the Constitution etc of the Isle of Man, 
(1911) London:HMSO. 
25 Petition of the House of Keys, 27th February 1907 (MacDonnell Report, Appendix I). 
that there would be much to be said for direct election ; and should a well-marked division on 
party lines become hereafter developed in that House, we would advise that the elections should 
then be by the constituencies”.26 They supported the Lord Bishop remaining in the Council 
because of “his traditional connection with the Council and Tynwald, … the ecclesiastical 
interests confided to his charge, and … his respected and authoritative personality”.27 They did 
not, however, see a justification for retaining other ecclesiastical officers, and were concerned 
that the Council should be of moderate size.28 As a result, the Isle of Man Constitution Act 
1919,29 removed the Archdeacon, the Vicar General, and the Receiver General. They were 
replaced with two members appointed for fixed terms by the Lieutenant-Governor, and four 
members elected by the House of Keys. Incremental reforms replaced both ex officio and 
appointed members with members elected by the House of Keys, so that since 1990 the 
Legislative Council has consisted of the President of Tynwald, who is elected by the members 
of Tynwald and sits ex officio as President of the Legislative Council; the Lord Bishop of Sodor 
and Man, who sits ex officio; the non-voting Attorney General, who sits ex officio; and eight 
Members of the Legislative Council (MLCs) elected for a fixed term by the House of Keys. 
MacDonnell rejected major changes to the executive, but after the Second World War the Manx 
executive was transformed – a 1946 Executive Council evolving by 1990 into the Council of 
Ministers, who held office at the pleasure of a Chief Minister appointed by Tynwald. Unlike in 
the UK, where the Prime Minister is appointed on the basis of their support in the House of 
Commons, in the Manx system the Chief Minister was appointed based on their support across 
Tynwald – including not only the directly elected MHKs, but the indirectly elected MLCs, and 
the unelected Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man. 
26 MacDonnell Report, at 21. 
27 Ibid, at 22. 
28 Ibid, at 22. 
29 Isle of Man Constitution Act 1919 s.6,7. 
The second major report rebalanced legislative power between the Keys and the Council. The 
absolute veto of the Council over legislation became a central concern for the Keys, resulting 
in a constitutional commission led by the Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, Lord MacDermott. 
The 1959 MacDermott Report30 led to the Isle of Man Constitution Act 1961. This Act 
introduced a procedure whereby a Bill could become an Act of Tynwald without the consent 
of the Legislative Council expressed both in their own Branch, and in Tynwald Court as a 
whole.31 This required not only a majority or, in some cases, a special majority in the House of 
Keys, but also that the Council should have had repeated opportunities to pass the Bill 
themselves. Originally, these provisions could only be triggered if the Council had failed to 
pass the Bill after two years, but in 1978 this was changed to one year.32 
These provisions were only used once. The Licensing (Sunday Opening) Bill 1979 came before 
the Legislative Council after all the requirements for dispensing with their consent had been 
met. The Council rejected it for a final time, knowing that it would become law in any case. 
There was an argument put that the Council should accede to the inevitable, but it did not 
convince, probably because it concerned the moral issue of drinking on Sunday.33 Perhaps more 
typical may be the approach of the Council to the Isle of Man Constitution Amendment Act 
1965. The Bill, replacing an ex officio member of the Council with an appointee of the House 
of Keys, had been rejected by the Council in two previous sessions, and was reintroduced 
having satisfied all the requirements for dispensing with Council assent. The Attorney General 
captures a mood which must have been present in the Council in these circumstances: “I 
heartily disagree with the matters proposed in the Bill. I am nevertheless glad in a way that the 
                                                          
30 See Belchem, op.cit., at 163-164. 
31 Isle of Man Constitution Act 1961 s.10(1).  
32 Constitution (Amendment) Act 1978. 
33 Council Proceedings, 9 January 1979, per Mr Kneale at C47. 
Bill has been passed so that it will not become law by default, and I beg to move that the Bill 
do pass”.34  
A key feature of the 1961 style mechanism was that the Council would always know whether 
the mechanism was live. The Council could always make a judgement whether the legislation 
was better acquiesced to, or the mechanism to bypass the Council deployed. In 2006, however, 
the Constitution Act 2006 simplified the 1961 mechanism to allow the House of Keys to 
dispense with the consent of the Council to a Bill which had not been passed by the Council 
within 12 months after being sent to the Council from the Keys. This override was triggered 
by the passing of a motion with a special majority of 17/24.35 Unlike the earlier mechanism, 
the Council has no opportunity to acquiesce in the legislation once the Keys has done all it 
needed to do in order to enable the override. As we will see, this change has had substantial 
constitutional implications. 
3. THE LISVANE REVIEW.  
As shown above, concern over the composition and functioning of Tynwald, and in particular 
the composition of Council and its relationship with the Keys, has been an endemic feature of 
the Manx constitutional landscape. The Lisvane Review had its origins in a 2015 motion which 
envisaged a referendum on the establishment of a directly elected, unicameral, Tynwald,36 itself 
emerging from “the exasperation of, year after year after year, interminable debates on 
reforming LegCo and knowing full well it is not going to go anywhere at all”.37 This specificity 
did not survive early debates in Tynwald, and the Lisvane Review sought to examine the 
functioning of the branches of Tynwald, to assess their efficacy, to consider the scrutiny 
                                                          
34 Council Proceedings, 29 March 1965, at 956.  
35 Constitution Act 2006 s.1. 
36 Tynwald Proceedings, 19 May 2015, 132(12), at 1726. 
37 Economic Policy Review Committee of Tynwald, CPRC-CM 1/14-15, 15 April 2015 at 503-
505 per AR Bell, the Chief Minister.  
structure, and to make recommendations for reform if necessary. The Review makes a number 
of recommendations which Lord Lisvane specifically severed from one another,38 although 
many of them interlink so that the Report represented a coherent, and very specific, vision of a 
reformed Tynwald.  
(a) The Lisvane Proposals.  
Lisvane recognised that one of the Manx drivers for unicameralism was “a dislike of the present 
status and mandate of Legislative Council”.39 Tapping into this well-established thread of 
critique in the Isle of Man, outlined above, he considered whether the functions of Council 
required the democratic mandate of direct election. He rejected this proposal, primarily because 
of the possibility of competing mandates between the two Chambers – in particular, directly 
elected Council members would be likely to have larger constituencies than MHKs, which 
might make the primacy of the House of Keys problematic.40 Having rejected direct election, 
he turned to consider in more detail the appointment of MLCs. 
A significant concern with the MLCs was that they were drawn from a small political class,41 
and that the process could be deadlocked in the House of Keys due to an inability to command 
a simple majority in appointing members.42 Lisvane’s solution was an independent 
Nominations Commission, which could accept nominations from the public, MHKs, MLCs, or 
candidates themselves, although no sitting MHK could be nominated. The Commission would 
be independent, consist of people of “standing and authority”, and include in its five person 
membership people from a range of diverse backgrounds, at least two women, and possibly “a 
minority of off-Island members”.43  The Commission would then recommend in order of merit 
                                                          
38 Lisvane, at 7. 
39  Lisvane, at 24 
40 Lisvane, at 28. 
41 Lisvane, at 29-30. 
42 Lisvane, at 30-33. 
43 Lisvane, at 31. 
a number of candidates and a single round of open voting by the Keys would fill the available 
places by order of the votes secured.44 If Council was to be more involved in scrutiny, as 
Lisvane recommended elsewhere, a modest increase of two members might prove necessary.45 
There was much less radical consideration of the two ex officio members, the Lord Bishop of 
Sodor and Man, and the non-voting Attorney General: an interesting reversal of turn of the 
century debates where the ex officio members were seen as a very significant problem in 
Council. A substantial discussion of the role of the Lord Bishop concluded that no serious 
change was needed – striking given the recurrent calls for the Lord Bishop to lose their place 
in Council or, as a less radical alternative, become like the ex officio Attorney General with a 
voice but no vote.46 
Lisvane also considered the powers of a Council which continued to lack the mandate of direct 
election. He recommended that LegCo should not vote on taxation or appropriation, that 
members should not normally be part of the executive, and that they should not vote on the 
appointment of the Chief Minister.47 Relatedly, Lisvane also recommended a number of 
reforms of the executive.48 Most radically, Lord Lisvane recommended the abolition of the 
Departmental Member system. This system allowed members of Tynwald who were not 
Ministers to be attached to Government Departments by the relevant Minister. Of the 32 
eligible members of Tynwald, only 5 did not have a role in a Government Department. Lisvane 
went so far as to describe this as a “reputational risk” to the Island internationally.49 Lisvane 
                                                          
44 Lisvane, at 31-33. 
45 Lisvane, at 34. 
46  Lisvane, at 35-37. 
47 Lisvane, at 33-34. 
48 Lisvane, at 38-41. 
49 Lisvane, at 45. 
anticipated that this change would free up significant resources within Tynwald, which he 
proposed be used for Tynwald to “raise its game”50 in relation to scrutiny.51  
Finally, Lisvane was concerned at the homogeneity of Tynwald. Although he recognised that 
an average age of 57.8 for members of Tynwald was a concern,52 gender was his primary focus. 
His proposals for appointment to Council included a direction that the new Nominations 
Commission work to improve diversity, but recognised that the starting point for female 
membership (with the Isle of Man below Iran, Bahrain and the Democratic Republic of Congo) 
was “an issue of such importance that both Tynwald and civil society need to address it with 
energy”.53   
(b) Reception. 
The Lisvane Review was published in April 2016, and discussion deferred until after the 
general elections to the House of Keys took place in September 2016. As well as containing a 
record number of women, discussed below, half of the new House was newly elected, the 
highest proportion since 1976. The Tynwald which considered the Lisvane Review in the 
summer of 2017 was, then, rather differently constituted from that which commissioned it. The 
end result of a long and complex series of votes was that some Lisvane proposals were not to 
be given further consideration, with the remainder sent to a Select Committee tasked to report 
on changes required for the implementation of those changes which had been accepted in 
principle; or to give further consideration as to their merits where Tynwald was still considering 
whether the reform was desirable.  
                                                          
50 Lisvane, at 46. 
51 See Lisvane, 50-65. 
52 Lisvane, at 65. 
53 Lisvane, at 65. 
The idea of a Nominations Commission was firmly left in abeyance. It appealed neither to 
supporters of radical reform, nor to members who looked for a modest refinement of a system 
which kept authority in the hands of the Keys. The Select Committee was, however, directed 
to consider whether there should be open voting in the appointment process. The place of the 
Lord Bishop in Council, despite Lord Lisvane recommending no change, became a centre piece 
of the debates. I discuss appointment of MLCs, and the controversy over the Bishop, below in 
4(a). 
Turning to Tynwald’s relationship with the executive, a proposal that Members of the 
Legislative Council should be Ministers only in exceptional circumstances was referred to the 
Select Committee for implementation; while the question of whether MLCs should be 
appointed as Departmental Members was referred for consideration on the principle. I discuss 
the role of the Legislative Council in forming the Manx Government below in 4(b). 
Finally, the call for Tynwald to address the need to make its membership more diverse was 
referred for implementation by a considerable majority, despite limited discussion. There was 
recognition of how difficult it was to identify concrete steps towards this desired goal, although 
a number of members made it clear that they rejected positive discrimination, which had not 
been proposed by Lisvane. I discuss this at more length below in 4(c).  
The Select Committee of Tynwald made a number of reports which formed the basis of 
extensive debate in Tynwald, much of which is discussed in the following section. The final 
report of the Select Committee54 was debated in Tynwald in July 2018.55 Dr Allinson, 
introducing the final report on behalf of the Committee, indicated that the Select Committee 
“would like to draw to a close the debate on the Lisvane Report”, 56  and closed the debate with 
                                                          
54 Final Report of the Select Committee on the Functioning of Tynwald, (2018), PP 2018/0109. 
55 Tynwald Proceedings, 18th July 2018, vol. 135(15) at 1809-1845. 
56 Ibid, at 1810, 2246-7. 
an air of finality: “I hope that by drawing a line under the Lord Lisvane Report and going on 
to think about different ways of reforming that do not rely on what he said, is the way 
forward”.57  With this final debate, Manx constitutional debate has entered a phase best 
described as post-Lisvane; thereby setting the scene for an analysis of the impact of the period 
of the Lisvane Review, and the Review itself, on the Manx constitution. 
4. A LEGACY FOR LISVANE? THREE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES.  
(a) Membership of the Legislative Council. 
One of the drivers for Lisvane was the difficulty that the House of Keys had in agreeing on 
new MLCs in 2015. As with earlier elections to the Council, candidates were appointed by 
secret ballot of the House of Keys. A candidate required a majority of the 24 Keys to vote in 
favour of their appointment, with each MHK being able to vote for as many different candidates 
as there were vacancies, but not being obliged to vote for this number, or indeed for any 
candidate. Balloting would continue until a sufficient number of candidates had commanded a 
majority vote. The first attempt to fill the vacancies, in March 2015, resulted in only two 
appointments. After a total of nine ballots, which included multiple breaks “to allow private 
discussions to take place between candidates and the proposers and seconders”,58 the Speaker 
concluded that “I think we have reached the point where there will not be a substantial change 
in the voting today. I therefore exercise my power to end voting today and to call for fresh 
nominations”.59 The process may, in part, have been comparatively fruitless because only 21 
voting members were present – making securing the majority of 13 for a candidate particularly 
difficult. Returning to the issue in June, however, a further eight ballots were required to 
                                                          
57 Ibid, at 1841, 3769-3771. 
58 House of Keys Proceedings,  16 March 2015, vol. 132(13), 877 K132 at 425-6; and at 567-
8. 
59 House of Keys Proceedings,  16 March 2015, vol. 132(13), 886 K132 at 799-801. For the 
March process, see http://www.tynwald.org.im/business/hansard/20002020/k150316.pdf . 
appoint to the two remaining vacancies – even with 23 members present, the requirement for a 
majority to appoint each candidate led to a protracted process, moving from a starting position 
of two candidates with 9 votes, one with 7 votes, one with 6, and one with 5. At the third ballot 
one candidate was elected with the required 13 votes, while a second candidate was one vote 
short with 12 votes, before their support ebbed, and a different candidate was finally appointed 
with 14 votes in the eighth ballot. 60  
Even before the 2015 process the Keys had begun to consider improvements, moving much of 
the process out of a statutory framework into Standing Orders, to allow modification without 
new legislation.61 This change did not move eligibility to stand for the Council into the realm 
of Standing Orders, 62 however, which meant that a proposal by some MHKs to adopt the 
Lisvane recommendation to exclude sitting MHKs from nomination was beyond the power of 
the House.63 Lisvane had noted the pattern of sitting MHKs moving in to the Legislative 
Council towards the end of their political careers, and had been concerned that such direct 
transfers reinforced public perceptions of the Legislative Council as “used largely to park 
superannuated MHKs”, while rejecting arguments that the experience of being an MHK was 
important to an MLC64 As we will see, however, the first MLC round after Lisvane appointed 
no sitting MHKs. 
The Committee noted that Lisvane’s recommendations around appointment had not yet been 
considered by Tynwald,65 and made comparatively minor changes to the process.  They 
recommended that the process should be required to be completed in a single day, that the 
                                                          
60 For full proceedings, see 
http://www.tynwald.org.im/business/hansard/20002020/k150622.pdf.  
61 Standing Orders Committee, First Report 2016-2017, PP 2015/0132 at para.17.  
62 Legislative Council Elections Act 2017. 
63 Standing Orders Committee, Fourth Report 2016-2017, PP 2017/063 at para.4-5. 
64 Lisvane, 10-12, 25, 27. 
65 Ibid, para. 6. 
ballot should remain secret, and that nominations should not be permitted from the floor. 
Encouraging candidates from outside Tynwald was seen as important, and the Speaker was to 
be under a duty to ensure that candidates and MHKs would meet after the close of 
nominations.66 Where there were at least three candidates and no candidate was elected, the 
candidate with the fewest votes would be omitted from the next round of voting. Voting would 
require a majority of the members present, rather than the former 13, and in the event of 
“continued failure to decide between two remaining candidates”, the Speaker could settle the 
issue by drawing lots.67  
The recommendations of the Committee were largely adopted by the Keys, but the provision 
for a default secret ballot was replaced with a default public ballot.68 A theme of those who 
supported the amendment in debates was that MHKs exercised a public function in appointing 
MLCs, and must be accountable for such decisions,69 as for analogous ones such as the 
appointment of the Chief Minister,70 although the proposer also believed that openness would 
result in “far less spoiling of papers, time wasting and underhand tactics”.71  
The 2018 elections of MLCs were, then, the first under the new procedure, and the first under 
a public ballot. Fifteen nominations were received, 9 female and 6 male. The House sat for 
fourteen minutes, and in a single ballot elected five women to the five vacancies. I return to 
analysis of the gender dimension of the changes to the process, and to the MLC, below. For the 
moment it is worth noting that if the fundamental purpose of the reforms was to secure a 
decisive vote quickly, they appear to have been very effective.  
66 Ibid, para. 13. 
67 Ibid, para. 14. 
68 Standing Orders of the House of Keys, 8.3(13), revised 4 April 2017. 
69 E.g. Mrs Corlett, at 755 K134 784-791. 
70 Eg. Mrs Caine at 756 K134 840-4. 
71 Miss Bettison, at 754 K134 at 767-8.  
Turning to the Lord Bishop, the question of whether the Lord Bishop should retain their voting 
rights became a live issue. In the end, the Bishop retained his vote by a close majority in the 
Keys (13 in favour, 11 against), and the Council (5 in favour, 3 against).72 
An earlier study had stressed the distinctive voice of the Lord Bishop in Tynwald,73 and a 
number of MHKs emphasised this.74 Valuing the Bishop’s voice was common in those who 
supported him retaining his vote, but MHKs such as Mrs Beecroft drew a sharp distinction 
between the Bishop’s voice, which she valued, and his vote, which she thought was 
inappropriate.75 Criticism of the vote of the Lord Bishop often focused on the lack of a 
democratic mandate, 76 itself linked to an argument that the continued vote was an anachronism, 
one of  “the last vestiges of feudal rule”.77 Other members read the antiquity of the Bishop’s 
vote differently, as contributing to “the things that make us special”.78 Another contested 
ground was the Manxness of the Bishop – a concern related to democracy but, as the historical 
overview above has demonstrated, distinct. This point was made most clearly by Mrs Caine, 
self-identifying as a person of no faith, who did not “see the need for a UK-appointed Bishop 
to be involved in our parliament”.79 
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The link between the ecclesiastical and the political, identified in the earlier study, came to 
dominate the debate, with constitutional change seen as reducing the willingness of the Church 
of England to operate the very small Diocese of Sodor and Man.80 Mr Malarkey warned that 
“new Members do not actually realise that if we take the vote off the Bishop we will not have 
a Bishop”.81 Mr Corkish feared that any loss of the Diocese would result in damage to “the 
standing of nationhood and the status of our Island”.82  In earlier debates the seat of the Bishop, 
rather than the vote, had been seen as crucial to the survival of the Diocese.83 By 1994, a change 
to the vote was sometimes seen as also raising this issue.84 Although other legislators disagreed, 
in 2001 Mr Singer referred to “an authoritative source” who had indicated that removing the 
vote would endanger the survival of the Diocese and lead to amalgamation with an English 
Diocese.85 
Some legislators considered loss of the Diocese as a price worth paying for reform.86 Others 
were sceptical that the Diocese would be lost, with Mr Hooper quoting an academic blog 
drawing parallels with the Dean of Jersey as indicating that losing the vote would not 
necessarily result in losing the ecclesiastical office.87 Although the Jersey argument for a voice 
without a vote had some traction,88 references to other jurisdictions sparked surprisingly strong 
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hostility from other members. Mr Malarkey for instance questioned “Why do we want to be 
the same as Jersey and Guernsey? We have a history of being different”.89  
The continued existence of the Diocese was central to the thinking of the Committee. 90 Their 
report emphasised what the Lord Bishop added to the Island – “the combination of the presence 
of the Lord Bishop on the Island and the continuing existence of the Diocese is a matter of 
great importance to the Island in general for social and community reasons; the Lord Bishop 
represents a significant part of our continuing heritage. The existence of the Diocese is … a 
continuing part of the Island’s cultural heritage”.91 The report identified as a key question 
whether the Diocese would cease to exist if the Lord Bishop were to lose his vote but remain 
in Tynwald, and had written to the Archbishop of York to clarify this point. 
The Archbishop replied on the 14th of November. In his reply the vote is described as: 
“a matter of great importance to the Church of England. It mirrors the position of the 
Diocesan Bishops who sit in the House of Lords … and … reflects the nature of the 
spiritual tradition of the Isle of Man. A voice on the Legislative Council without a vote 
would seem to me to be a very weak position. It would be akin to the position of the 
Deans in the Channel Islands, who are allowed to speak but not to vote in the 
Parliament. You may be aware that the Channel Islands do not form a separate diocese 
and have no diocesan bishop; instead they are incorporated into an English Diocese.”92 
The Archbishop had been informed by the Lord Bishop that “the absence of a spiritual vote in 
Tynwald will cause an issue for many residents of the Island, particularly where voting is 
required on spiritual issues … The Bishop serves on Tynwald as a focus for all faith groups on 
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the Island and his voting role on the Legislative Council is testimony to the fact that Tynwald 
takes seriously the spiritual nature of the Island’s identity, and its moral and ethical 
responsibility for the life of its people”. He concluded: “If the Lord Bishop’s vote were to be 
removed, in my view this would significantly undermine the case for Sodor and Man being a 
separate diocese”. 
As a result, the Committee concluded that loss of the vote would lead to downgrading of the 
Diocese to a part of another Diocese based in England.93 This was crucial to their conclusion 
that the Lord Bishop should retain his vote. From the debate which followed the Report, it is 
equally clear that this conclusion was important to a number of members. Mr Malarkey, for 
instance, confessed to having been undecided on the question of the vote, but he was not 
undecided on whether the Isle of Man should have a Bishop. Others remained accepting of the 
loss of the Diocese, with Mr Shimmins categorising it as “a decision for the Anglican Church, 
not this Hon Court”.94   
A number of MHKs indicated that to lose the vote, and the Lord Bishop, was irreversible, but 
that a decision could be made to do this at a later date.95  Given the closeness of the vote, this 
may prove significant. The earlier study found that individual office-holders varied 
considerably in their contributions to the legislative process.96 Bishop Eagles was installed just 
in time for the final debate on whether his office should carry a vote in the Legislative Council. 
His contributions to the debate over his vote indicated that he saw an organic link between the 
Manx state and the Manx church, and claimed special expertise in moral and ethical 
understanding – a stance unlikely to reconcile MHKs unconvinced of his being able to vote in 
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the national legislature. His highest profile contribution since, during the passage of the 
Abortion Act,97 seems likely to exacerbate this.  
Abortion law in the Isle of Man was considerably more restrictive than that of England and 
Wales, even after a substantial piece of legislation in 1995,98 which led to Manx women 
travelling to England to privately secure lawful terminations.99 The Abortion Bill, intended to 
decriminalise abortion and make it very significantly easier to obtain on the Island, polarised 
public opinion sharply. As well as building on a public consultation which indicated a very 
strong majority for reform, however, it had secured very strong support in the House of Keys, 
being approved by a margin of 22 to 2.  
At the First Reading in the Legislative Council,100 the Lord Bishop was concerned that the Bill 
“takes us into a new category and one which sits possibly outside and beyond the norms of 
liberal Western understanding, for all that it may be compliant with human rights”.101 At the 
Second Reading102 the Lord Bishop emphasised his special duties: “to have a concern for 
everyone who lives on this Island”; and “to care for people of faith, for people of all faiths to 
some degree”.103 He was very involved in the debate, going so far as to call a number expert 
witnesses to answer questions from himself and others. Although not categorised as such, the 
MHK who had led the passage of the Bill was called as a rebuttal witness by an MLC, as was 
an employee of the Department of Health and Social Care. The Third reading secured the 
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support of 8 members.104 The only member voting against the Bill was the Lord Bishop, who 
tabled a very substantial number of amendments to be considered. These included reducing a 
number of time limits under the legislation, and limiting abortion on the grounds of disability, 
issues which had been debated in, and rejected by the House of Keys. As well as disagreeing 
with statements of fact made in the Keys, the Lord Bishop was concerned at “moral 
slippage”,105 and indicated he would vote against the Bill because it did not show “that hallmark 
of the liberal society that enables us to respond graciously and compassionately to all, including 
those who are seriously disabled”.106 Challenged on his reference to moral slippage, he 
expanded in his final remarks that “there is scope for the provision for abortion to become 
expedient and for the underlying issues of human relationships, of poverty, of education and 
of deprivation to be given less emphasis than they require”.107 
Unsurprisingly, his intervention was seen as controversial, for instance being described by the 
Campaign for Abortion Law Modernisation (CALM) as “cynical repeats of previous, failed, 
attempts to restrict the scope of the Abortion Reform Bill”.108 The passage of the Abortion Act 
alone gives an important example of Bishop Eagles as an active member of the Legislative 
Council, prepared to return to issues of principles decided by substantial majority in the Keys, 
and prepared not only to contribute to the discussion of contentious issues of principle, but to 
shape that discussion by the calling of expert witnesses.  
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(b) The Powers of the Council. 
As discussed above, the Council and its members were formerly the preeminent organ of 
executive government in the Isle of Man. By the twenty-first century, the Council’s role was 
narrower. The Council took a role in Tynwald’s appointment of the Chief Minister, typically 
following a General Election of MHKs and individual members of the Council could be 
appointed to Ministerial, or more commonly Departmental Member, roles in government.  
In 2016 Tynwald met to appoint a new Chief Minister. Although the appointment would be by 
a majority of the voting members of Tynwald together, for the first time this would be separate 
in stage, with the vote of MHKs taken first, and then the vote of the Legislative Council taken 
“once the results in the Keys have been announced”,109 with an expectation that the Council 
would vote with the majority of the Keys.110 No member had a majority of the Keys’ votes, 
with Mr Quayle receiving a plurality of 12 votes from the 24 MHKs. Members of the 
Legislative Council were then called upon to vote, and Mr Quayle received all 9 votes, 
including that of the Lord Bishop, giving him the majority needed to be elected as Chief 
Minister. 
As will be recalled, Lisvane had recommended that members of the Legislative Council should 
not vote on the appointment of the Chief Minister, and should not normally be members of the 
government. The Select Committee’s remit was clarified to give them the authority to consider 
whether MLCs should be able to vote on the appointment of the Chief Minister. The Select 
Committee intended to report on the issue in February 2018, but constitutional change overtook 
them. 
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In 2016 the House of Keys had passed a Bill to exclude members of the Legislative Council 
from the vote on the Chief Minister.111 The Bill had failed to pass in the Legislative Council. 
In 2017 a motion was proposed to allow the Bill to proceed in any case. Mr Thomas, the 
proposer, raised two constitutional issues in support of the motion. Firstly, the importance of 
“a mandate from the people voting at a General Election through to the election of a Chief 
Minister”.112 Secondly, “that … it is the will of the elected Branch, the  House of Keys, that 
should prevail”.113 The vote was close, with precisely the special majority of 17 needed,114 but 
resulted in both the use of the new style override for the first time, and a significant change in 
the body which approves the Chief Minister. 
Although exactly this change had been recommended by Lord Lisvane, the proposer went to 
some length to distance the legislation from Lord Lisvane, pointing out that it had been passed 
before Lord Lisvane visited the Island, and that “this initiative is an Isle of Man initiative 
initiated by a proud Manxman inside the House of Keys at the beginning of 2016”.115  
The current Chief Minister, Mr Quayle, opposed the motion. He felt that the Chief Minister 
needed to command the support of both the House of Keys and the Legislative Council. “We 
are not Westminster, we are not Jersey, we are not Ireland, where obviously the House of 
Commons vote for the chief minister; we are a small jurisdiction. We have been going now for 
over a thousand years, and I believe having the support of both areas will help a Chief Minister, 
whoever they are, going forward”.  
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Mr Boot pointed out that the change in appointment of the Chief Minister would result in fewer 
individuals voting on the appointment of the Chief Minister, which he categorised as 
“concentrating the power into fewer hands – it does not seem very democratic to me”. Mr 
Malarkey robustly rejected this categorisation because of the democratic legitimacy of the Keys 
– “it is 24 votes who have the mandate of the people behind them”. I return to this tension 
between democratic mandate and concentration of power below. 
It is difficult to see this change as anything other than a prioritisation of the democratically 
elected Keys over the Council. This conclusion is reinforced by the way in which it was secured 
against the will of the Council. Removing the link between the Chief Minister and the 
Legislative Council may, however, be seen as bringing Tynwald closer into line with other 
small, bicameral, democracies. In his study of bicameralism in the Caribbean, O’Brien 
accounts for the survival of bicameralism in part because the constitutions ensure that the 
second chamber is dominated by the Government. 116 Formerly, with the Council having a 
distinctive role in the appointment of the Chief Minister, Tynwald was closer to a position of 
the second chamber having at least some authority over the Government. With the severing of 
this link, Tynwald has moved towards a less hierarchical relationship, with Government and 
Council operating in more distinctly separate spheres. 
(c) Gender. 
The Isle of Man is proud of having the first national legislature in the Anglophone world to 
include women in its electorate, in 1881. At the time Lisvane carried out his review, however, 
only 2 of the 35 members of Tynwald were women, putting female representation in Tynwald 
at 5.7%, equivalent to 178th place in the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s league table.117 During 
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evidence, Lisvane had asked a number of witnesses why this might be the case, and had found 
the answers “not reassuring” – stressing a “nasty, toxic, environment”, where Tynwald “was 
seen as a male club”.118 
A particular issue in the Manx context is the lack of a strong party system. Mechanisms used 
elsewhere in the British Isles to encourage more equal representation of women by putting 
pressure on political parties have no real traction in a system so dominated by independent 
candidates.119 As noted earlier, Lisvane had recommended a Nominations Commission 
required to take diversity into account in selecting candidates, but even had this 
recommendation been accepted, it would not have addressed the gender balance in the 
(dominant) House of Keys. One Lisvane witness, Ms Hannan, a former MHK who had sat for 
20 years, advocated the reservation of one third of seats for women.120 Lord Lisvane did not 
adopt this recommendation, instead describing the problem as “not something easily corrected 
by executive action”.121 He did however recommend that “both Tynwald and civil society need 
to address it with energy”, in the first instance at the upcoming General Election to the House 
of Keys.122 Compared with the crispness of other recommendations by Lord Lisvane, the report 
limits itself to identifying a problem. There is some evidence, however, that simply 
highlighting the problem may have had an impact on the myriad individual decisions which, in 
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a small jurisdiction based primarily on independent members, can impact on gender 
representation. 
In the last pre-Lisvane General Election to the House of Keys, 10.9% of all candidates were 
women; while 8.33% of those elected were women – a 42 vote swing in one constituency would 
have raised this to 12.5% of the House. Under-representation of women in the Keys seemed to 
flow primarily from under-representation in candidates coming forward, rather than a low 
success rate at elections.123 In the General Election after the Lisvane Review had been 
published, the picture was rather different. 50 candidates were male, and 13 female – female 
candidates rising to 20.63%. A historic 5 women were elected to the Keys - at 20.83%, very 
closely reflecting the gender division of candidates. This was achieved despite three of the two 
member constituencies not having any female candidates. Simply identifying this as a public 
policy agenda, and placing the Manx position in an unflattering global context may itself have 
encouraged more women to consider running for the Keys. Determining the reasons for the 
increased percentage of female candidates will require further qualitative field-work with 
candidates.   
Turning to the Legislative Council, in the 2015 appointments, discussed above, six candidates 
were nominated in advance of the initial debate. All six candidates were men, and included 
three sitting MHKs, and one sitting MLC. Further male candidates emerged during the process, 
which resulted in the appointment of four men to the Legislative Council. 
By the 2018 appointments the President of Tynwald had been put under a duty by Tynwald to 
encourage a wide range of candidates to the Legislative Council. Five appointments were open. 
Of the fifteen candidates nominated, 9 were female – a jump from 0% of nominees to 60%. 
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This was the first MLC election with open polls. 124 From the fifteen candidates, the House of 
Keys elected 5 women, and no men, none of whom had sat as MHKs. The extent of the change 
is patent. 
This has resulted in a Legislative Council today consisting of three male ex officio members 
(the President of Tynwald, the Lord Bishop and the non-voting Attorney General), 3 male 
appointed members, and 5 female appointed members. Excluding the non-voting Attorney 
General, and the normally non-voting President of Tynwald, this gives a female majority in the 
Legislative Council, at 55.5%.  
Tynwald in 2018, then, is a rather different place from the Tynwald upon which Lord Lisvane 
reported. The 5.7% female representation in Tynwald he identified has become 31.25% in just 
two years. In terms of the global league table that Lord Lisvane alluded to, mapping this against 
the 1st June 2018 data would place Tynwald between Tunisia (at 43rd best,  on 31.3%), and 
Cameroon (at 44th best, on 31.1%); and very close to the UK’s 32%. 
An obvious first response to this improvement is respect for the speed of change,125 particularly 
striking in a system where party affiliation is comparatively unimportant, so that incumbency 
is used as “an easy indication of quality and experience”.126 Apart from the fact that even this 
exhilarating change leaves some way to go before a roughly equal number of men and women 
sit in Tynwald, and it is too early to say if it will be sustained, there remains one cause for 
concern. As argued above, a broad trend in Manx constitutional history is the gradual increase 
in the powers of the House of Keys until, today, it is clearly the dominant part of Tynwald. 
124 Keys Proceedings, 12 March 2018, 134(14) at 699-703.  
125 Compare this with the Legislative Council in Hong Kong, which moved from 4% in 1980 
to 11% in 1991 to 16% in 2012 – see further W Tam, “Women representing women? Evidence 
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126 R McGregor et al, “Why so few women and minorities in local politics? Incumbency and 
affinity voting in low information elections”, (2017) Representation 53, 135 at 136. 
This direction of travel has only been increased by the recent constitutional developments 
discussed above. Tynwald as composed today, however, does not have 30% female 
representation in the dominant Keys, and the Legislative Council. In the Keys, only 20% of the 
members are female. The 30% figure for Tynwald overall owes much to the number of female 
members of the Legislative Council – as noted above, a majority of the voting members, and 
more than 60% of those appointed members able to point to even an indirect mandate. 
The division between a predominately male House of Keys, and a predominantly female 
Legislative Council (at least in voting terms), could add an important new element to the 
traditional clashes between Keys and Council, which until well into the 20th century were 
composed entirely of men. There may be some evidence this has already begun. In May 2018 
the Chief Minister called a meeting with the five women newly elected to the Legislative 
Council, following complaints he had received from some MHKs regarding the political 
assertiveness of the MLCs,  to “discuss the differences between the branches of parliament and 
government and, in particular, the role of the Legislative Council, which is primarily one of 
scrutiny”.127 The President of Tynwald was later reported to have had a meeting with the Chief 
Minister to discuss the matter, and the separation between executive and parliamentary 
business, with the President strongly supporting the right of every member of Tynwald to 
political expression.128 The causal explanation of this controversy may be the newness of four 
of the five MLCs, and not their gender, analogous to the impact of the unprecedentedly large 
number of new SNP MPs in Westminster in 2015.129 Nonetheless, a controversy centring on 
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the role of five female legislators, and none of their male peers, invokes the famous argument 
of MacKinnon that “the state is male in the feminist sense: It sees and treats women the way 
men see and treat women”.130  
5. LESSONS FROM THE LISVANE PERIOD.  
As this study shows,  the Isle of Man faces a number of challenges distinctively associated with 
smallness. 
(a) Resources for constitutional development. 
A key tension revealed by this study is that between external input and Manx legitimacy. This 
took two forms in the Lisvane process. 
Firstly, there was a clear conflict within Tynwald as to the value of comparative constitutional 
materials. Automatic adoption of foreign solutions developed to address foreign problems is, 
thankfully, no longer a part of the Manx political scene. Tynwald has come a long way since 
Samuel Norris, an MHK famous in his time for his support for increased Manx autonomy - 
argued that “we should know, and the public should know, where we are varying, if we do 
vary, from the English law, and the reason for which the variation is made”.131 Rejection of 
this approach is not the same as rejecting insights to be gained from critical consideration of 
the approaches and experiences of other democracies when making decisions for the Isle of 
Man. Deemster Doyle, speaking extrajudicially in the United States, has put it perhaps most 
strongly: 
“Laws should be developed and problems solved by reaching out for knowledge and 
solutions that may be provided by approaches from jurisdictions beyond our local 
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frontiers. … A blinkered, insular and local approach encourages ignorance and 
encourages conflict. We ignore developments in other jurisdictions at our peril.”132 
Secondly, there is the contribution of Lord Lisvane himself. A steady theme in the debates was 
that as an outsider Lord Lisvane had not understood the Manx constitution. 133 Small 
jurisdictions will inevitably lack specialist capacity in some areas, and outsourcing particular 
tasks to foreign specialists is common. In the Manx context, for instance, around 11,000 
journeys a year are taken by Manx residents referred to English hospitals for treatment under a 
contract with the Manx government. 134  Aspects of the Manx legal system similarly entwine 
with the English system for similar reasons – all Manx prisoners receiving a life sentence are 
transferred to English prisons,135 while the Manx judicial system has made increasing use of 
English lawyers since the early 20th century. 136  There is not the same emphasis on a uniquely 
Manx way to treat cancer, or even deal with life term prisoners, as there is on a uniquely Manx 
way to govern the Isle of Man.  
We find the same tension between the expertise of an external specialist in governance and the 
need for national legitimacy and authenticity elsewhere. In a failed 2016-7 attempt at 
constitutional reform in Alderney, for instance, the States of Alderney commissioned a review 
by the Constitution Unit at UCL137. In discussion of the first part of the review, which led to 
the termination of the process, members of the States questioned whether “a London 
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consultant” was really necessary;138  whether an alternative specialist “well-known to the States 
and States’ Members here over a number of years” might be a better choice;139  and whether 
on-Island consultants “could actually help us enormously in some of the areas that we quite 
often seek – I will not say overseas assistance but – assistance from elsewhere”.140 How is this 
tension to be resolved? 
One possible strategy is for external expertise to be drawn upon in a directed way, so that the 
external expert is clearly offering specialist knowledge rather than wide-ranging political and 
constitutional judgement. Interestingly, the motion which led to the Lisvane Review was 
originally more directed, with an emphasis on unicameralism. 141 In the light of the authenticity 
issues later raised around the Review, a focus on exploring the merits and implementation 
challenges of unicameralism may have resulted in a Review which, while it may have been 
rejected, could not so easily be interpreted as a manifesto developed by an outsider. Rather, a 
clearer remit for Lord Lisvane may not have “disturbed their sense of ownership and control 
over the Island’s constitutional development which had to be reasserted”.142 
While constitutional review by an outside expert faces challenges of legitimacy, capacity 
challenges faced by small jurisdictions may contribute to the power of such reviews. One way 
of looking at the impact of a constitutional review such as that carried out by Lord Lisvane is 
very linear. A report is generated, recommendations are adopted (or not), and the constitutional 
debates move on. The sheer messiness of the Manx constitutional reforms since 2016 show the 
limitations of this perspective. As the Select Committee noted in its final report: “During the 
course of our deliberations and publication of the three previous reports we have witnessed a 
138 Hansard Report, States of Alderney Meeting 19 October 2016, Neil Harvey at 18. 
139 Ibid, Neil Harvey at 19. 
140 Ibid, Graham McKinley at 21. 
141 Tynwald Proceedings, 19 May 2015, 132(12), at 1726.; 
142 Morris, op.cit., at 128. 
series of meaningful and radical changes to the way our Parliament is structured and its decision 
making process”.143 As the discussion above shows, Tynwald did not necessarily wait on 
formal discussion of Lord Lisvane’s recommendations in order to implement them.  
If the legacy of Lisvane began before the Review had been debated, it may last surprisingly 
long. 2018 may fairly be seen as the end of the period of constitutional reflection immediately 
associated with the specifics of Lisvane. Such a wide ranging review, and the evidence 
generated by the process, will have a much longer term impact. The paucity of constitutional 
materials within even a wealthy small democracy such as that of the Isle of Man will mean the 
legacy of such a constitutional review is considerably longer than in a larger state. The Lisvane 
Review may have a legacy similar to that of its century old predecessor, the MacDonnell 
Report, still being discussed today. 
(b) Managing intimacy as a constitutional aim in a small democracy. 
The demise of the secret ballot for MLC appointments is prima facie a reinforcement of the 
paramount importance of a democratic mandate to Manx political legitimacy. It may also be 
read, however,  as a turn away from a particular solution to a small democracy problem, that 
of managing intimacy. 
Managing intimacy has been identified as a particular issue in small states, where actors 
recognise that they will interact over a long period of different time in different relationships, 
and so must get along.144  Writing in relation to ministries of education in small states,145 Bray 
notes that “In contrast to medium-sized and large states, everybody seems to know everybody 
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else, and does so in a wide range of different contexts”.146 This may make it difficult to apply 
neutral bureaucratic rules, and to limit interactions to formal settings.147  The only MHK to 
speak at length on the benefits of the secret ballot for appointments to LegCo, Mr Malarkey, 
tapped into exactly this theme when advising his newly appointed colleagues:  
“I think the new Members have to experience a round or two in here to find out just 
how difficult it is at times to pick who you are putting into a job on the same pay scale 
as you, basically, for the next five years … One of them might be your next door 
neighbour; one might be your brother-in-law … with a public vote you are not going to 
have much conversation out of your brother-in-law or your next door neighbour for the 
next five years because he has found out you have not voted for him and you have voted 
for the best person you considered for the job … I think that sometimes you can get 
stuck in a situation. Remember we are a small Island; we all know each other, and once 
you start bringing people in …”.148 
In the past being able to lie about one’s support for a candidate in a secret ballot was used to 
maintain a good working relationship between an MHK and new MLC,149 as well as maintain 
good relationships in the community more broadly. A Nominations Commission may have 
been an alternative mechanism for managing intimacy. The move to the open ballot without a 
Nominations Commission, on the other hand, reduced the mechanisms by which these 
intimacies could be managed, which Mr Malarkey hinted could be particularly difficult with 
newcomers to the Manx political scene.  
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One response to the challenge of managing intimacy may simply be to privatise the problem, 
by identifying it as part of normal political life which those who stand for political office need 
to face up to.150 In supporting the move to an open ballot, Ms Bettison saw no reason why 
openness in the appointments process would impact on the relationships of MHKs and MLCs, 
who she felt “will be more than able to conduct themselves in a professional manner”.151  
As Corbett and Veenendaal have argued in their review of thirty-nine small democracies 
around the world, this intimacy is a significant difference between small and large democracies: 
“The sheer size of electorates in larger states means that political officeholders simply do not 
have the time and resources to communicate directly with all their constituents. By contrast, 
small states are able to overcome these limitations, albeit with varying effects”.152 An 
alternative approach, therefore, would be to recognise that the challenges of managing intimacy 
are different in a small democracy, and that constitutional reform can fairly recognise this – 
that managing intimacy can be a structural, as well as a personal, challenge.  
(c)An over-concentrated democracy? 
A fundamental tension revealed by this study of recent constitutional change in the Isle of Man 
is that between seeking democratic legitimacy for all those exercising governance power, and 
the concentration of power in a small number of hands. Sutton has argued that “in small 
societies it is relatively easy for a determined, unscrupulous, individual … to dominate all or 
most aspects of the country’s life”.153 With the demise of the plenipotentiary Lieutenant-
Governor, the Isle of Man has moved some way from this, but it is clear that constitutional 
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developments have increased the power of the 24 directly elected members of the House of the 
Keys.  
A comparison with other small democracies suggests that over-concentration may be a genuine 
problem for Manx democracy. In 2012 Johnston and McLean analysed the population per 
elected representative in the only or lower houses of all independent and semi-independent 
territories with a population between 50,000 and 150,000.154 Of the 22 considered, both the 
Channel Island jurisdictions analysed were amongst the most generous. Guernsey (1328) and 
Jersey (1920) were in the most generous five, along with Bermuda (1783), Greenland (1829) 
and the Marshall Islands (1645). The Isle of Man (3521) was at 13th place of the 22, bracketed 
by American Samoa (3083), the Cayman Islands (3083), the Federated States of Micronesia 
(3664), and Tonga (3692). The difference between the other Crown Dependencies and the Isle 
of Man is striking.  
One possible reform would be to increase the size of the House of Keys. If the Keys was to be 
returned to its pre-12th century size of 32 members,155 the Manx ratio on Johnson and McLean’s 
figures would move to 2640, 8th most generous of the 22 small democracies, bracketed by 
Dominica and the Seychelles. The ratio of representation would remain notably less generous 
than that of the closest comparators to the Isle of Man – the fellow Crown Dependencies of 
Jersey and Guernsey. 
A significant concern over any expansion of the House of Keys to bring the representation ratio 
down would be cost, both in terms of salary and infrastructure. This could be met by increasing 
resourcing of Tynwald – a politically sensitive argument, particularly as the Isle of Man 
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continues to deal with the impact of the 2008 economic downturn. Reconfiguring the MHK 
role as part-time, remunerated pro rata, could, as was discussed during the Lisvane debate, 
reduce diversity in the Tynwald. More significant resources could be freed up by the abolition 
of the Legislative Council, and the move to a unicameral chamber of the kind already found in 
Jersey and Guernsey. 
An alternative approach to expanding the Keys would be to reverse the direction of travel, and 
increase the power within the Manx constitution exercised by those outside the Keys. As the 
Isle of Man has gained autonomy, and the internal tensions between the national and the 
Imperial parts of the constitution have reduced, democratic legitimacy through election has 
increasingly become the only form of legitimacy. An alternative route might draw upon 
arguments which explore the legitimacy of non-elected power in a democracy, for instance 
through an emphasis on producers of empirical data-based assessments informing citizens,156 
or on functional representation;157 or give referenda or other forms of more direct democracy 
a role in the Manx constitutional scene;158 or seek to supplement deliberative democracy by 
other fora.159 This would require a radical diversification of the ways that Tynwald, as revealed 
in the Lisvane debates, conceptualises democratic legitimacy. 
6. Concluding thoughts.
The Lisvane period demonstrates that constitutional reform in a small democracy is possible. 
Although the reforms adopted were not as radical as those proposed by Lord Lisvane, taken 
together they constitute the most significant constitutional changes in the Isle of Man since at 
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least the 1980s. Consideration of this period of constitutional change demonstrates three 
significant challenges facing small democracies considering constitutional reform – how to 
draw upon external resources to inform decision making in a way which retains legitimacy; 
how to account for the special problem of managing intimacy in a small democracy; and how 
to combine an emphasis on direct electoral mandate for political authority with a small number 
of directly elected members without concentrating political power in a small group. 
More narrowly, I have argued that the Lisvane period can be understood as a twenty-first 
century iteration of the ancient conflict between the House of the Keys and the Legislative 
Council. The recent constitutional developments have moved the balance further in favour of 
the democratically elected House of Keys. The relationship between the branches of Tynwald 
has not been settled during the Lisvane period. The interest in unicameralism within Tynwald 
which led to the commissioning of Lord Lisvane remains, and may lead to discussion of radical 
reform of Tynwald in the future. Less dramatically, we are likely to see ongoing discussion of 
the role of members of the Legislative Council, and the composition of the Council, perhaps 
most pointedly in relation to the vote of the Lord Bishop.  
Although Lord Lisvane’s concerns over the gender balance in Tynwald, and the pattern of 
MHKs moving into the Council, did not result in any formal change, the results of the post-
Lisvane elections and appointments have led to dramatic change in the membership of 
Tynwald. The combination of a predominantly male democratically elected chamber, and a 
majority female unelected chamber, adds a new dimension to the ancient tension between Keys 
and Council. Additionally, the new intake of MLCs, in sharp contrast to previous rounds, are 
beginning their national political careers in the Council. In the longer term, we may see a 
reversal of the previous career path, with an MLC standing for election to the dominant House 
of Keys. As noted above, the success rate for female candidates to the Keys is very similar to 
that for male candidates. It is possible, therefore, that the increased representation of women in 
the Council may lead to increased representation in the Keys. 
Turning to the relationship between Tynwald and the executive, as noted the change in the 
process of the appointment of Chief Minister has concentrated political power with the 24 
MHKs. This is a very recent change to a comparatively new form of executive government, 
and a Chief Minister has yet to be appointed solely by the Keys. The relationship between the 
Isle of Man Government, and the House of Keys, is likely to throw up fresh controversies. 
